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Revision 217 Apr 2009 - EstagiariosProgesp

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META TOPICPARENT name="Acervo"

GOVERNING THE COMMONS - The evolution of institutions for collective action

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FORM FIELD ISBN/ISSN ISBNISSN 0-521-37101-5
FORM FIELD Link Link Email saopaulo@cambridge.org
FORM FIELD Tipo Tipo Livro
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|*FORM FIELD Complemento*|Complemento|Contents

CHAPTER 1 Reflections on The Commons -1

Three influential models - 2 The tragedy of the commons - 2 The prisoner's dilemma game - 3 The logic of collective action - 5 The metaphorical use of models - 7 Current policy Prescriptions - 8 Leviathan as the "only" way - 8 Privatization as the "only" way - 12 The "only" way? - 13 An alternative solution - 15 An empirical alternative - 18 Policy perscriptions as metaphors - 21 Policies based on metaphors can be harmful - 23 A challenge - 23|

FORM FIELD Localização Física LocalizaoFsica?
>
>
|*FORM FIELD Complemento*|Complemento|Contents

CHAPTER 1 Reflections on The Commons -1

Three influential models - 2 The tragedy of the commons - 2 The prisoner's dilemma game - 3 The logic of collective action - 5 The metaphorical use of models - 7 Current policy Prescriptions - 8 Leviathan as the "only" way - 8 Privatization as the "only" way - 12 The "only" way? - 13 An alternative solution - 15 An empirical alternative - 18 Policy perscriptions as metaphors - 21 Policies based on metaphors can be harmful - 23 A challenge - 23

CHAPTER 2

An Institutional Approach To The Study Of Self-Organization And Self-Governance In SPR Situation

The CPR situation - 29 CPRs and resources units - 30 Rational appropriators in complex and uncertain situations - 33 Interdependence,indepedent action,and collective action - 38 The theory of the firm - 40 The theory of the state - 41 Three puzzles: supply,commitment,and monitoring - 42 The problems of supply - 42 The problems of credible commitment - 43 The problems of mutual Monitoring - 45 Framing inquiry - 45 Appropriation and provision problems - 46 Multiple levels of analysis - 50 Studying institutions in field settings -55

CHAPTER 3

Analyzing Long-Enduring,Self-Organized,And Self-Governed CPRs - 58 Communal tenure in high mountain meadows and forests - 61 Torbel,Switzerland Hirano,nagaike,and yamanoka villages in Japan - 65 Huerta irrigation institution - 69 Valencia - 71 Murcia and Orihuela - 76 Alicante - 78 Zanjera irrigation communities in the Philippines - 82 Similarities among enduring,self-governing CPR institutions - 88 Clearly defined boundaries - 91 Congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local conditions -92 Collective - choice arrangements - 93 Monitoring - 94 Graduated sanctions - 94 Conflict-resolution mechanism - 100 Minimal recognition of right to organize - 101 Nested enterprises - 101

CHAPTER 4 Analyzing institutional change - 103 The competitive pumping race - 104 The logic of the water-rights gme -106 The litigation game -111 The Raymond Basin negotiations - 111 The West basin negotiations - 114 The central basin litigation - 123 Conformance of parties to negotiated settlements - 125 The entrepreneurship game - 127 Reasons for forming a district to include both basins - 130 Reasons againist forming a district to include both basing - 131 The polycentric public -enterprise game - 133 The analysis of institutional supply - 136 Incremental,sequential,and self-transforming institutional - 137 Reformulating the analysis of institutional change - 139

CHAPTER 5

Analyzing institutional failures and fragilities - 143 Two turkish inshore fisheries with continuing CPR problems - 144 California groundwater basing with continuing CPR problems - 146 A Sri Lankan fishery - 149 Irrigation development projects in Sri Lanka -157 The fragility of nova scotain inshore fisheries - 173 Lessons to be learned from comparing the cases in this study - 178

CHAPTER 6 A framework for analysis of self-orgnizing and self-governing CPRs - 182

The problems of supply,credible commitment,and mutual monitoring - 185 Evaluation benefits - 192 Evaluation costs - 198 Evaluation shared norms and other opportunities -205 The process of institutional change - 207 Predicting institutional change - 210 A challenger to scholarship in the social sciences - 214 Notes - 217 References - 245 Index - 271|

FORM FIELD Localização Física LocalizaoFsica? 119

Revision 117 Apr 2009 - EstagiariosProgesp

Line: 1 to 1
Added:
>
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META TOPICPARENT name="Acervo"

GOVERNING THE COMMONS - The evolution of institutions for collective action

  • Autor: Elinor Ostrom
  • Ano: 1990
  • ISBN/ISSN: 0-521-37101-5
  • Editora: Cambridge University Press
  • Link: Email saopaulo@cambridge.org
  • Complemento: Contents

CHAPTER 1 Reflections on The Commons -1

Three influential models - 2 The tragedy of the commons - 2 The prisoner's dilemma game - 3 The logic of collective action - 5 The metaphorical use of models - 7 Current policy Prescriptions - 8 Leviathan as the "only" way - 8 Privatization as the "only" way - 12 The "only" way? - 13 An alternative solution - 15 An empirical alternative - 18 Policy perscriptions as metaphors - 21 Policies based on metaphors can be harmful - 23 A challenge - 23

CHAPTER 2

An Institutional Approach To The Study Of Self-Organization And Self-Governance In SPR Situation

The CPR situation - 29 CPRs and resources units - 30 Rational appropriators in complex and uncertain situations - 33 Interdependence,indepedent action,and collective action - 38 The theory of the firm - 40 The theory of the state - 41 Three puzzles: supply,commitment,and monitoring - 42 The problems of supply - 42 The problems of credible commitment - 43 The problems of mutual Monitoring - 45 Framing inquiry - 45 Appropriation and provision problems - 46 Multiple levels of analysis - 50 Studying institutions in field settings -55

CHAPTER 3

Analyzing Long-Enduring,Self-Organized,And Self-Governed CPRs - 58 Communal tenure in high mountain meadows and forests - 61 Torbel,Switzerland Hirano,nagaike,and yamanoka villages in Japan - 65 Huerta irrigation institution - 69 Valencia - 71 Murcia and Orihuela - 76 Alicante - 78 Zanjera irrigation communities in the Philippines - 82 Similarities among enduring,self-governing CPR institutions - 88 Clearly defined boundaries - 91 Congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local conditions -92 Collective - choice arrangements - 93 Monitoring - 94 Graduated sanctions - 94 Conflict-resolution mechanism - 100 Minimal recognition of right to organize - 101 Nested enterprises - 101

CHAPTER 4 Analyzing institutional change - 103 The competitive pumping race - 104 The logic of the water-rights gme -106 The litigation game -111 The Raymond Basin negotiations - 111 The West basin negotiations - 114 The central basin litigation - 123 Conformance of parties to negotiated settlements - 125 The entrepreneurship game - 127 Reasons for forming a district to include both basins - 130 Reasons againist forming a district to include both basing - 131 The polycentric public -enterprise game - 133 The analysis of institutional supply - 136 Incremental,sequential,and self-transforming institutional - 137 Reformulating the analysis of institutional change - 139

CHAPTER 5

Analyzing institutional failures and fragilities - 143 Two turkish inshore fisheries with continuing CPR problems - 144 California groundwater basing with continuing CPR problems - 146 A Sri Lankan fishery - 149 Irrigation development projects in Sri Lanka -157 The fragility of nova scotain inshore fisheries - 173 Lessons to be learned from comparing the cases in this study - 178

CHAPTER 6 A framework for analysis of self-orgnizing and self-governing CPRs - 182

The problems of supply,credible commitment,and mutual monitoring - 185 Evaluation benefits - 192 Evaluation costs - 198 Evaluation shared norms and other opportunities -205 The process of institutional change - 207 Predicting institutional change - 210 A challenger to scholarship in the social sciences - 214 Notes - 217 References - 245 Index - 271

  • Localização Física: 119

META FORM name="AcervoForm"
FORM FIELD Título Ttulo GOVERNING THE COMMONS - The evolution of institutions for collective action
FORM FIELD Autor Autor Elinor Ostrom
FORM FIELD Editora Editora Cambridge University Press
FORM FIELD Ano Ano 1990
FORM FIELD Local Local
FORM FIELD ISBN/ISSN ISBNISSN 0-521-37101-5
FORM FIELD Link Link Email saopaulo@cambridge.org
FORM FIELD Tipo Tipo Livro
|*FORM FIELD Complemento*|Complemento|Contents

CHAPTER 1 Reflections on The Commons -1

Three influential models - 2 The tragedy of the commons - 2 The prisoner's dilemma game - 3 The logic of collective action - 5 The metaphorical use of models - 7 Current policy Prescriptions - 8 Leviathan as the "only" way - 8 Privatization as the "only" way - 12 The "only" way? - 13 An alternative solution - 15 An empirical alternative - 18 Policy perscriptions as metaphors - 21 Policies based on metaphors can be harmful - 23 A challenge - 23|

FORM FIELD Localização Física LocalizaoFsica?
 
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