Acervo

GOVERNING THE COMMONS - The evolution of institutions for collective action

CHAPTER 1 Reflections on The Commons -1

Three influential models - 2 The tragedy of the commons - 2 The prisoner's dilemma game - 3 The logic of collective action - 5 The metaphorical use of models - 7 Current policy Prescriptions - 8 Leviathan as the "only" way - 8 Privatization as the "only" way - 12 The "only" way? - 13 An alternative solution - 15 An empirical alternative - 18 Policy perscriptions as metaphors - 21 Policies based on metaphors can be harmful - 23 A challenge - 23

CHAPTER 2

An Institutional Approach To The Study Of Self-Organization And Self-Governance In SPR Situation

The CPR situation - 29 CPRs and resources units - 30 Rational appropriators in complex and uncertain situations - 33 Interdependence,indepedent action,and collective action - 38 The theory of the firm - 40 The theory of the state - 41 Three puzzles: supply,commitment,and monitoring - 42 The problems of supply - 42 The problems of credible commitment - 43 The problems of mutual Monitoring - 45 Framing inquiry - 45 Appropriation and provision problems - 46 Multiple levels of analysis - 50 Studying institutions in field settings -55

CHAPTER 3

Analyzing Long-Enduring,Self-Organized,And Self-Governed CPRs - 58 Communal tenure in high mountain meadows and forests - 61 Torbel,Switzerland Hirano,nagaike,and yamanoka villages in Japan - 65 Huerta irrigation institution - 69 Valencia - 71 Murcia and Orihuela - 76 Alicante - 78 Zanjera irrigation communities in the Philippines - 82 Similarities among enduring,self-governing CPR institutions - 88 Clearly defined boundaries - 91 Congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local conditions -92 Collective - choice arrangements - 93 Monitoring - 94 Graduated sanctions - 94 Conflict-resolution mechanism - 100 Minimal recognition of right to organize - 101 Nested enterprises - 101

CHAPTER 4 Analyzing institutional change - 103 The competitive pumping race - 104 The logic of the water-rights gme -106 The litigation game -111 The Raymond Basin negotiations - 111 The West basin negotiations - 114 The central basin litigation - 123 Conformance of parties to negotiated settlements - 125 The entrepreneurship game - 127 Reasons for forming a district to include both basins - 130 Reasons againist forming a district to include both basing - 131 The polycentric public -enterprise game - 133 The analysis of institutional supply - 136 Incremental,sequential,and self-transforming institutional - 137 Reformulating the analysis of institutional change - 139

CHAPTER 5

Analyzing institutional failures and fragilities - 143 Two turkish inshore fisheries with continuing CPR problems - 144 California groundwater basing with continuing CPR problems - 146 A Sri Lankan fishery - 149 Irrigation development projects in Sri Lanka -157 The fragility of nova scotain inshore fisheries - 173 Lessons to be learned from comparing the cases in this study - 178

CHAPTER 6 A framework for analysis of self-orgnizing and self-governing CPRs - 182

The problems of supply,credible commitment,and mutual monitoring - 185 Evaluation benefits - 192 Evaluation costs - 198 Evaluation shared norms and other opportunities -205 The process of institutional change - 207 Predicting institutional change - 210 A challenger to scholarship in the social sciences - 214 Notes - 217 References - 245 Index - 271

     

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